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INTRODUCTION 
The use of independent contracting has dramatically increased over 
the last decade—a phenomenon which, in part, is attributable to the changing 
nature of how we work.  Technology and perceptions of work-life balance 
are among the factors contributing to this trend.1  Employees increasingly 
seek more flexibility in work arrangements—both in terms of hours and 
locations—while employers seek to reduce benefits and other labor costs. 
The nature of work has similarly evolved.  Workplaces are less labor-
intensive as jobs become automated or outsourced.2  In other cases, the 
workplace itself is virtual, with work from remote locations becoming the 
rule rather than the exception.  The gig economy has also emerged, where 
workers are labeled as independent contractors and where the “hiring party” 
provides platforms for work rather than work itself.3 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps surprising that little has changed 
in how the law defines “employment” and “work.”  Certainly, whether a 
worker is classified as an “employee” has far-reaching consequences, 
including taxation, qualification for unemployment and employer-sponsored 
benefits, workers’ compensation coverage, and coverage under federal, state, 
and local labor and employment laws.  With these issues hanging in the 
balance, why has so little been done to tailor definitions of “employer” and 
“employee” to the modern workplace, and what are the consequences of 
Congress and the courts often failing to act in this regard? 
Except in the ridesharing industry,4 the trend in the courts has been 
to favor employment status and extend protections to contingent workers.5  
                                               
 1. Tad Milbourn, In the Future, Employees Won’t Exist, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2015), 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/13/in-the-future-employees-wont-exist/. 
 2. See Christian Bodewig, Replacing work with work: New Opportunities for workers 
cut out by automation?, BROOKINGS, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2017/02/21/replacing-work-with-work-new-opportunities-for-workers-cut-out-
by-automation/; see also Gene Zaino, The Impact of Automation on the Independent 
Workforce, FORBES (May 2, 2017, 09:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanre
sourcescouncil/2017/05/02/the-impact-of-automation-on-the-independent-
workforce/#63ee9a175c51. 
 3. Emilia Istrate & Jonathan Harris, The Future of Work: The Rise of the Gig Economy, 
NAT. ASS’N OF CTYS.: CTYS. FUTURES LAB (Nov. 2017), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Gig-Economy.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(“black car” drivers for car service platform held to be independent contractors and not 
employees); McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2017) (Uber drivers held to be independent contractors rather than employees); cf. Cotter v. 
Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1033–34, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (court approved settlement 
that retained independent contractor status for Lyft drivers). 
 5. “Contingent workers” are defined as freelancers, independent contractors, 
temporary workers, consultants, or other outsourced and non-permanent workers who are 
typically hired on a per-project basis. They can work on site or remotely. “Gig workers’ are a 
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Likewise, there are changes in the definition of who may qualify as an 
“employer.”  These changes are most evident in decisions holding affiliated 
companies to be joint employers under a variety of scenarios, including the 
extension of potential franchisee liability to franchisors6 and in 
administrative and judicial decisions holding leasing companies and the 
companies hiring them to be joint employers for Title VII purposes.7 
In an economy where jobs are shrinking and there are no workplace 
guarantees, these trends make sense, although they are in conflict with the 
Trump Administration’s laissez-faire or pro-company policies in the 
employment arena.8  There is also the issue of drivers for Lyft and Uber who 
                                               
subcategory of contingent worker who provide services brokered through tech-based 
platforms, such as Uber or Lyft. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376, 383 
(2d Cir. 2015), as modified, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (interns as employees where 
employer is the “primary beneficiary” in the relationship and suggesting factors relevant to 
this analysis); cf. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018) 
(in considering the propriety of certifying a class of delivery drivers allegedly misclassified as 
independent contractors in violation of a state wage order, California Supreme Court 
suggested that the drivers may qualify as employees rather than independent contractors and 
endorsed the three-part ABC test to determine whether the drivers were misclassified, with 
Dynamex bearing the burden of proof on the issue). 
 6. See Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (plaintiff stated a 
claim that franchisor and franchisee were joint employers for wage-hour purposes where 
Domino’s Pizza required its franchisees to use a certain payroll system and to adopt 
management, operation, hiring and inspection policies); see also Bonaventura v. Gear Fitness 
One NY Plaza LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53269, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (“The 
Second Circuit has not squarely addressed whether a franchisor of an independently owned 
franchise may be the ‘employer’ of a franchise employee for purposes of FLSA liability” and 
declaring that “[i]n the absence of clear guidance,” courts in that Circuit will rely on the 
economic reality test to determine whether an employment relationship exists). 
 7. Baystate Alt. Staffing v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 676 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding staffing 
corporation joint employer of temporary workers along with client companies who supervised 
their work); cf. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 147–49 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(general contractor and defunct subcontractor joint employers of drywall installers, where they 
shared authority over and codetermined the key terms and conditions of the installers’ 
employment). 
 8.  See, e.g., USDOL’s June 2017 decision to withdraw Administrator’s Interpretation 
No. 2016-1, “Joint Employment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act” (Jan. 20, 2016). Michael J. Lotito and Ilyse 
Schuman, DOL Withdraws Joint Employer and Independent Contractor Guidance, (June 7, 
2017), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/dol-withdraws-joint-employer-
and-independent-contractor-guidance; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., US SECRETARY OF LABOR 
WITHDRAWS JOINT EMPLOYMENT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR INFORMAL 
GUIDANCE (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607. The 
National Labor Relations Board retreated from its position that franchisors may be held to be 
joint employers of their franchisee’s employees. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd. v. 
Brandt, 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 NLRB LEXIS 635 (overruling the 2015 
decision in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015), 2015 
NLRB LEXIS 672, holding that franchisors and franchisees could be joint employers, and 
returning to pre-Browning-Ferris joint employer standard that two or more entities may be 
deemed joint employer under the NLRA if one entity exercises control over essential 
employment terms of the other entity’s employees). However, the Hy-Brand decision was 
vacated, and the Browning-Ferris decision reinstated as a result of a motion to reconsider 
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straddle the line between independent contractors and employees without 
reaping any of the benefits of employment and without sharing in the vast 
majority of profits realized from the platforms under which they work.9 
From a policy standpoint, contingent workers are in need of 
protection.  Not only are technology and market forces driving the growing 
prevalence of “gig work,” but gig and other contingent workers are becoming 
increasingly marginalized in what is already a grossly inequitable bargaining 
relationship.  These and other issues mandate that Congress and the courts 
reconsider who is entitled to wage-hour and other protections. 
Part I of this Article explores traditional definitions of employment 
from the common law and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 20-Factor 
Test to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s economic realities test and other 
statutory definitions of the term.  Part II examines expanding definitions of 
who qualifies as an “employer,” with an emphasis on joint employment 
relationships.  Part III highlights new definitions of work that have emerged 
in the literature and as a result of litigation over the status of contingent 
workers in a gig economy, examines policy issues underlying worker 
classification in the twenty-first century, and proposes solutions to protect a 
growing contingent workforce while—at the same time—preserving the 
flexibility and conveniences associated with gig work. 
I. EMPLOYEES VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS:  WHY IT 
MATTERS AND CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF WORKERS AND WORK 
A. Consequences of Worker Classification 
Whether a worker is classified as an “employee” or “independent 
contractor” has profound consequences to employees and employers alike.  
From the employee’s perspective, classification affects the following: 
taxation; entitlement to unemployment compensation; Social Security and 
Medicare benefits; eligibility for health insurance and other employer-
                                               
based, in part, on Member Emanuel’s failure to recuse himself in the Hy-Brand case (his 
former firm represented a party in Browning-Ferris). See Hy-Brand, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 103, 
at *1–2. The Board’s reasoning in Browning-Ferris was recently endorsed by the D.C. Circuit. 
See Browning-Ferris of Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
Despite this decision, the Board appears to be headed in the opposite direction. The new Board 
Chairman (John Ring) and the Board issued notice that it was considering a definition of joint 
employment through rule-making that mirrored the majority opinion and dissent in Hy-Brand. 
Interested parties are to submit comments to the proposed rule on or before January 28, 2019. 
See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB Further Extends Time for Submitting Comments on 
Proposed Joint-Employer Rulemaking in Light of DC Circuit’s Recent Browning-Ferris 
Decision (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-further-
extends-time-submitting-comments-proposed-joint-employer-1. 
 9. Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees: The Answer Will Shape the 
Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omrib
enshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-shape-the-sharing-
economy/#45fb85bc5e55. 
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provided benefits; and coverage under federal, state, and local labor and 
employment laws, and state workers’ compensation statutes.10  These 
coverages and benefits are generally unavailable to independent contractors11 
who pay self-employment taxes and certain business expenses and who—at 
least, in theory—have increased flexibility in their work and the ability to 
realize profits from their labors. 
From the employer’s perspective, businesses significantly reduce 
their expenses and obligations by classifying workers as independent 
contractors.  Specifically, they avoid paying Federal Social Security, 
Medicare, and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes, and state 
employment taxes by classifying workers as independent contractors rather 
than as employees.12  Moreover, businesses are liable for their employees’ 
negligent acts committed during the course of and within the scope of 
employment.13  Business also must comply with federal, state, and local laws 
regulating the employment relationship and be certain of its terms and 
conditions.14  No similar obligations generally attach when independent 
contractors are hired instead of employees. 
Under all of these circumstances, there is no question that businesses 
realize substantial cost-savings, estimated at twenty-five to thirty percent, by 
classifying their workers as independent contractors.15  Indeed, the only 
downsides to such classification are that the business has less control over 
the manner and means by which the work is accomplished where independent 
contractors, as opposed to employees, perform the work, and there are 
                                               
 10. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE-HOUR DIV. Misclassification of Employees 
as Independent Contractors, https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited 
on Sept. 19, 2018). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally Peña v. Greffet, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1114–15 (D.N.M. 2015); 
Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Restatement (Third) 
Agency § 7.07(1)); Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000); see also Valentine v. Hodnett, No. 5:14-CV-72, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188205, at 
**22-23 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015) (to hold an employer vicariously liable for the acts of an 
employee, a plaintiff must prove that the employee caused harm while acting within the scope 
of his or her general authority and in furtherance of the employer’s business and objectives). 
 14. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(employees, not independent contractors, enjoy collective bargaining rights under the National 
Labor Relations Act, which expressly excludes independent contractors from its definition of 
“employee” at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)); Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 480, 483 
(8th Cir. 2000) (employees and not independent contractors are covered by Title VII); 
Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 1996) (physician – who 
was an independent contractor – could not maintain a Title VII action against hospital where 
he had privileges). 
 15. Paula M. Singer & Laura Francisco, Benefits of Compensating Independent 
Contractors vs. Employees, ALA-APA: LIBRARY WORKLIFE: HR E-NEWS FOR TODAY’S 
LEADERS (May 17, 2005), http://ala-apa.org/newsletter/2005/05/17/benefits-of-compensating-
independent-contractors-vs-employees/. 
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significant potential costs and penalties associated with misclassifying 
employees as independent contractors.16 
The government, too, has a stake in worker classification. According 
to the IRS, worker misclassification results in billions of dollars in lost 
revenues.17  Similar dollars are lost on the state and local levels as a result of 
worker misclassification.18 
B. Statutory Definitions of Employment 
Coverage under federal, state, and local labor and employment laws 
typically depends on employee status.  Given the pivotal nature of this 
determination, it is surprising that the labor and employment statutes provide 
little guidance on who is an employee.  For example, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an 
employer,” subject to certain exceptions.19  Title VII’s definition of 
“employer” is also circular, focusing on the number of employees (fifteen or 
more) “for each working day in each of the twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year” and on whether the putative 
employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.20  Neither definition 
discusses the nature of the work performed. 
Similar issues surrounding the statutory definitions of “employee” 
and “employer” may be found in the Employee Retirement Income Security 
                                               
 16. For example, in O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 
2016), in the proposed settlement agreement, Uber agreed to pay $84 million, plus an 
additional $16 million contingent on an initial public offering (IPO) reaching one-and-a-half 
times Uber’s most recent valuation. Id. at 1117, Declaration of Shannon Liss-Riordan In 
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Exh. 6 at 
13, 21. The class in O’Connor consisted of 385,000 California and Massachusetts drivers. The 
district court declined to approve the settlement agreement as “not fair, adequate and 
reasonable.” O’Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. Under California law, Cal. Lab. Code 
§ 226.8, it is unlawful to misclassify workers as independent contractors. 
 17. See David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four 
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 144–45 & n.35 (2015); Michael 
Phillips, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Ref. No. 2009-30-035, While Actions Have Been Taken 
to Address Worker Misclassification, an Agency-Wide Employment Tax Program and Better 
Data Are Needed 8 (2009). According to a 2009 report, the IRS estimated that worker 
misclassification costs the IRS approximately “$54 billion per year in underreported 
employment tax, including losses of $ 15 billion in unpaid FICA and UI taxes.” Id. at 8. The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and state governments 
have increasingly concentrated their efforts to correct worker misclassification. As of October 
2017, 37 states have formed partnerships with the USDOL to share and coordinate 
enforcement of worker misclassification. A sample agreement between the USDOL and the 
Alabama Department of Labor appears on the USDOL website at https://www.dol.gov/whd/
workers/Misclassification/al1.htm. 
 18. Bauer, supra note 17, at 144. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2018). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). 
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Act (“ERISA”),21 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),22 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).23  Accordingly, the real task of 
identifying employment relationships and defining their characteristics has 
been left to the courts. 
Court decisions have been inconsistent at best, based on the 
overlapping tests used to determine employment status and an ever-changing 
list of factors deemed relevant to this analysis.  Although courts tend to define 
employment more broadly when the statute has a remedial purpose, like the 
ADEA,24 they most often rely on the common law test—and not on the 
underlying statutory purpose—in determining whether an individual is an 
employee or independent contractor.25 
C. The Traditional Common Law Agency Test 
The common law definition of “employee” appears simplistic but 
produces varied results.  Its focus is on “the hiring party’s right to control the 
manner and means by which the work is accomplished.”26  Courts have 
articulated several factors, in addition to the right to control, weighing in on 
this analysis, including: (1) the skill required to do the job; (2) the source of 
the instrumentalities and tools; (3) the location of the work; (4) the duration 
of the relationship between the parties; (5) whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (6) the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; (7) the method of 
payment; (8) the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; (9) 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (10) 
whether the hiring party is in business; (11) the provision of employee 
benefits; and (12) the tax treatment of the hired party. 27 
None of the foregoing factors is dispositive, and the list of factors is 
non-exhaustive. 28  Maximization of the right to control tends to militate in 
favor of employee status.  The common law test applies to determine who 
                                               
 21. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2018) (defining “employee” as “any individual employed by 
an employer”). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2018) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by any 
employer,” excepting certain elected officials, their personal staff, immediate advisors and 
those on a policymaking level). 
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018). The FLSA’s economic realities test used to determine 
employment status under that Act is discussed at notes 37–51 and accompanying text infra. 
 24. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The term ‘employee’ 
is to be given a broad construction in order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the ADEA”). 
 25. Id.; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) 
(applying common law test to ERISA and endorsing the use of that test to determine 
employment status whenever a federal statutory definition of “employee” is less than helpful). 
 26. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
 27. Id. (often referenced as the “Reid factors”); see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23 
(applying the Reid factors to determine whether the terminated plaintiff qualified as an 
“employee” for purposes of ERISA coverage). 
 28. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52. 
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qualifies as an “employee” under federal statutes that fail to provide a 
meaningful definition of that term.29 
D. The IRS 20-Factor Test: A Variation of the Common Law Test 
The IRS has adopted a variation of the common law right-to-control 
test to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee. 
30  This test identifies the following twenty factors as helpful in determining 
whether an employment relationship exists: 
1. Control – If the worker “is subject to the will and 
control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but 
how it shall be done,” the worker is an employee.31 
2. Right to hire, fire, supervise, and pay assistants – 
Such actions suggest independent contractor status. 
3. Training – Employer-provided training and 
mandatory attendance at meetings suggests an employment 
relationship. 
4.  Set work hours – Independent contractors set their 
own hours. 
5. Integration – Where the worker’s services are an 
integral part of the hiring party’s operations, it is more likely 
that the worker is an employee. 
6. Work schedule – Independent contractors set their 
own work schedules. 
7. Services performed by worker – Independent 
contractors maintain flexibility in who will perform the 
work. 
8. Permanency or duration of the relationship – 
Longevity or permanency in the relationship suggests 
employment status; by contrast, independent contractors 
tend to be hired on a project basis or for a set duration. 
                                               
 29. Darden, 503 U.S. at 318. 
 30. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 31. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(c)–1(b). 
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9. Sequence of work – Independent contractors 
typically are free to determine how and in what order tasks 
will be performed. 
10. Location of services – While not determinative, 
particularly with the marked increase in virtual and gig 
work, employees are usually required to perform work on 
the employer’s premises. 
11. Tools – Independent contractors supply their own 
tools. 
12. Reports – Where the worker is required to submit 
periodic reports, an employment relationship is suggested. 
Where independent contractors are required to submit 
reports, it is typically based on contractual benchmarks for 
the completion of a project. 
13. Investment – Investment in the work facilities or a 
particular project suggests independent contractor status. 
14. Remuneration and withholding – Employees tend to 
be paid on an hourly or salaried basis subject to withholding, 
in contrast to independent contractors who tend to be paid 
by the project or job. Independent contractors pay self-
employment taxes and are not subject to withholding. 
15. Job-related expenses – Independent contractors pay 
their own business and travel expenses (although some of 
their expenses may be invoiced pursuant to the parties’ 
contract), in contrast to employees, who are typically 
reimbursed for their expenses. 
16. Termination – Most employees can be terminated at 
will without the employer incurring liability. The work of 
independent contractors typically ends when a project ends 
or the contract expires. 
17. Ability to incur profit and loss – An independent 
contractor has the ability to realize profit or loss on the job. 
This should be distinguished from employee bonuses which 
may be linked to company sales or profits. 
18. Full-time employment – Independent contractors 
are not hired on a full-time basis. 
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19. Right to work for multiple persons or entities – 
Independent contractors typically work for more than one 
person or entity. 
20. Services offered to the public – Independent 
contractors generally hold themselves out for hire to the 
public or to other contractors within a particular trade.32 
The IRS streamlined this test in 2004, dividing the factors relevant 
to employment status into three categories based on (1) “behavioral 
control,”33 (2) “financial control,”34 and (3) the relationship of the parties.35  
Together, these categories and their factors focus on the totality of the 
relationship to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or 
employee.36 
E. The Statutory or Primary Purpose Test 
The statutory or primary purpose test focuses on the purpose of the 
underlying statute and its application instead of examining the indicia of the 
parties’ relationship.  The test has its origins in the United States Supreme 
Court decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,37 in which the Court 
held that “newsboys” were employees within the meaning of the National 
Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) definition of “employee.”38  The Court 
                                               
 32. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 33. IRS, Behavioral Control, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/behavioral-control (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). Behavioral control focuses on 
whether the hiring party has the right to control how the hired party works and considers: the 
type of instructions and degree of instruction given in connection with the work to be 
performed; evaluation systems utilized; and the training provided. Id. 
 34. IRS, Financial Control, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/financial-control (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). “Financial control” refers to facts 
determinative of whether the business has the right to control “the economic aspects of the 
worker’s job” and encompasses the following factors: whether the hired party makes a 
significant investment in the company; whether the hired party has an opportunity for profit 
and loss; the method of payment for work performed; whether the worker’s services are 
available to the market; and whether the hired party incurs unreimbursed expenses. Id. 
 35. IRS, Type of Relationship, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/type-of-relationship (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). The “type of relationship” 
category focuses on how the worker and business perceive their relationship to each other. 
Factors relevant to this determination include: the existence of a written contract; the provision 
of employee benefits; whether the services provided are key to the business’ activity; and the 
permanency of the parties’ relationship. Id. 
 36. See IRS, Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, https://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-
employee (last visitedupdated Apr. 23, 2018). 
 37. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 38. Id. at 131. “Newsboys” referred to adult men who sold newspapers to customers on 
the city streets at established locations on a full-time basis, often for a number of years without 
turnover. The defendant publishers refused to bargain with them, on the basis that they were 
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rejected the notion that Congress intended to apply the common law agency 
test to the NLRA’s definition of “employee” and instead looked to the 
economic reality of the relationship and the special purposes of the Act to 
reach its conclusion.39  The Court explained its reasoning as follows: 
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term 
‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must 
be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes 
of the legislation. The word “is not treated by Congress as a 
word of art having a definite meaning. . . .”  Rather, “it takes 
color from its surroundings [in] the statute where it appears,” 
and derives meaning from the context of that statute, which 
“must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the 
end to be attained.”40 
Congress subsequently amended the NLRA to expressly exclude 
independent contractors from the statutory definition of “employee,”41 and 
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Darden,42 endorsing the common law agency test as the benchmark to 
determine employment status when a federal statute offers little guidance on 
the issue.43  Since Darden, courts have abandoned the statutory or primary 
purpose test as a vehicle to determine whether an individual is an employee 
or independent contractor for coverage purposes.44 
F. The Fair Labor Standards Act’s Economic Realities Test 
The FLSA provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the term 
“employee” means “any individual employed by an employer.”45  Excepted 
from the definition are volunteers, the personal staff of elected officials, 
ministerial and cleric employees, and military commissary employees.46  An 
                                               
independent contractors over whom the publishers exercised only incidental control. The 
NLRB concluded that the newsboys were employees but, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion. 
 39. Id. at 120, 129. 
 40. Id. at 124 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018). 
 42. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 43. Id. at 322–23. 
 44. However, courts have considered a statute’s purpose in other coverage contexts. See, 
e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (Supreme Court considered statutory 
purpose in deciding to extend Title VII’s anti-retaliation protection of “employees and 
applicants for employment” to former employee who allegedly received a negative reference 
after he filed an EEOC charge); Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 768 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(“Focusing first on the relationship between putative joint employers is essential to 
accomplishing the FLSA’s ‘remedial and humanitarian’ purpose.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
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“employer” is likewise defined by the Act as “any person acting directly or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”47  These 
circular definitions are of little help in defining “work” for FLSA coverage 
purposes.  The statutory definition of “employ,” which is “to suffer or permit 
to work,”48 is too broad to be of much assistance, encompassing employees 
as well as independent contractors within its reach.  Courts interpreting the 
FLSA have devised an “economic realities test” to determine whether a 
worker is an employee within the meaning of that Act.49 
The economic realities test is broader than the common law test used 
to distinguish employees from independent contractors.  To determine 
whether an individual is an “employee” under the FLSA, courts look to the 
economic reality of the business relationship as a whole.50  How the parties 
label the relationship is of little consequence.51  Instead, courts adopt a 
totality of the circumstances test in which a number of factors are analyzed 
with the focus on whether the worker is economically dependent on the hiring 
party or is in business for him or herself.52  Depending on the court, a four-, 
five- or six-factor economic realities test may apply.53  These factors may 
include: 
(1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer 
over the workers; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or 
loss and investment in the business; (3) the degree of skill 
                                               
 47. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018). 
 49. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (affirming 
the lower court’s decision that the common law test did not apply to the FLSA because “the 
Act concerns itself with the correction of economic evils through remedies which were 
unknown at common law . . . [and] the underlying economic realities . . . lead to the 
conclusion that the [plaintiffs] were and are employees of [the defendant].”). The Supreme 
Court first articulated the economic realities test in Rutherford. Decades later, the Court 
expressly adopted the test for FLSA cases in Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 
471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985). 
 50. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301. 
 51. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (“This 
inquiry is not governed by the ‘label’ put on the relationship by the parties or the contract 
controlling that relationship. . . .”). 
 52. See Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
556 U.S. 1129 (2009); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 
1998); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 53. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 139 n. 19 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(adopting the five-factor test of United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)); Keller v. Miri 
Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 807–12 (6th Cir. 2015) (six-factor test); Scantland, 721 
F.3d at 1311–12 (six-factor test); Martin v. Spring Break ‘83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 251 
(5th Cir. 2012) (four-factor test); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343 (five-factor test); Zheng v. Liberty 
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (six-factor test focusing on “functional control”); 
Morrison v. Int’l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (four-factor 
test); Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1381 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 919 (1985) (six-factor test); Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117 (6th Cir. 
1984) (six-factor test). 
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and independent initiative required to perform the work; (4) 
the permanency or duration of the relationship; and (5) the 
extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer’s 
business.54 
While the courts differ on the factors and their emphasis, they agree 
that the factors are non-exhaustive and that no single factor is 
determinative.55  “Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic 
dependence of the alleged employee and each must be applied with this 
ultimate concept in mind.”56  Stated differently, the ultimate question is 
whether workers are employees “as a matter of economic reality . . . 
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”57  Where an 
individual is able to work for competing companies, he or she is considered 
to be less economically dependent on the putative employer.58  While this 
relinquishment of control is not dispositive, it weighs in favor of independent 
contractor status.59 
G. Hybrid Test: Combining the Common Law and Economic 
Realities Tests 
The hybrid test is a combination of the common law and economic 
reality tests, with an emphasis on the right-to-control factor.60  Generally, the 
                                               
 54. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301; Zheng, 355 F.3d at 67. 
 55. See, e.g., Thibault v. BellSouth Telcoms., Inc., 612 F.3d 843, 848–50 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(splicer hired to repair telecommunications grid after a hurricane was an independent 
contractor and not an employee of the telephone company, its contractor or subcontractor, 
despite the fact that the splicer performed hourly work that was subject to daily assignment, 
where splicer did not work exclusively for defendants, provided his own materials and 
equipment and determined how his work was to be performed); Gustafson v. Bell Atl. Corp., 
171 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (chauffeur for one of defendant’s executives was 
technically an independent contractor, but qualified for FLSA coverage because the defendant 
exercised complete control over his on-the-job activities). See generally Scantland, 721 F.3d 
at 1312. 
 56. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343. 
 57. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); Saleem, 854 F.3d at 141–46; 
Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 58. See Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., 854 F.3d 131, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2017), (the fact 
that “black-car” drivers, who owned or operated “black-car” franchises, “could (and did) work 
for [defendant’s] business rivals and transport personal clients while simultaneously 
maintaining their franchises without consequence” suggested that drivers were independent 
contractors); Keller, 781 F.3d at 807 (“If a worker has multiple jobs for different companies, 
then that weighs in favor of finding that the worker is an independent contractor.”). 
 59. Saleem, 854 F.3d at 141–42; see also Thibault, 612 F.3d at 846–847; Carrell v. 
Sunland Constr., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1993); Bates v. Bell Tel. Co., 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21507, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1993), aff’d 22 F. 3d 300 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 60. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 414 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting 
the court’s application of the hybrid test to determine employee status in Title VII cases and 
adopting it in a joint employment context but modifying the relevant factors to “adequately 
capture the unique circumstances of joint employment”); Hathcock v. Acme Truck Lines, Inc., 
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right-to-control component of the test focuses on who hires and fires, 
supervises, and sets work schedules.  If that control lies with the worker, the 
relationship will be considered an independent contractor relationship.  The 
economic realities component of the test, by contrast, focuses on how the 
worker is paid, whether his or her payments are subject to withholdings, 
whether the worker is eligible for employee benefits, and whether the worker 
works for the hiring party exclusively or has other clients and customers.61 
The hybrid test is most commonly, but not exclusively, applied to 
determine employee status for Title VII coverage purposes.62  This 
application is questionable, however, in light of Supreme Court precedent 
suggesting that the common law agency test63 applies to determine employee 
status in Title VII cases. 
H. The ABC Test: Simplifying the Analysis 
The final standard used to determine employee status is commonly 
referred to as the ABC test.64  This test presumes that a worker is hired as an 
employee and places the burden on the hiring party to establish that the 
worker is an independent contractor by proof of each of the following factors:  
(a) that the worker is free from control and direction over 
performance of the work, both under the contract and in fact; 
(b) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual 
course of hiring entity’s business; and (c) that the worker is 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation or business of the same nature as the work 
performed for the hiring entity.65 
                                               
262 F.3d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 928 (2002) (employee status in Title 
VII case); Deal v. State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee 
status in Title VII and ADEA case). 
 61. Deal, 5 F.3d at 118–19. 
 62. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Dall. Cty. Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep’t, 479 F.3d 377, 
380 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the 
meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test.”) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d. Cir. 
1983) (mentioning the use of hybrid test for Title VII cases); see also Hill v. City of Austin 
Pub. Works, A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 
2008) (utilizing the hybrid test to find that workers were not employees of plaintiff-
employer); D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 927 A.2d 113, 121 (N.J. 
2007) (utilizing hybrid test under the state whistleblower statute). 
 63. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992) (an ERISA case in 
which the Court applied the common law test but stated, in dicta, that the common law test 
applies to determine who qualifies as an “employee” in federal statutes, like Title VII, that do 
not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of the term); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 
Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997) (suggesting common law test applied in Title VII case). 
 64. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court., 416 P.3d 1, 48–50 (Cal. 2018). 
 65. See id. 
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The appropriate inquiry under Part (c) of the test “is whether the 
person engaged in covered employment actually has an independent 
business, occupation, or profession of the same nature as the work to be 
performed, not whether he or she could have one.”66  Where the hiring party 
fails to establish each of these elements, the worker is deemed to be an 
employee and not an independent contractor.67 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS 
EFFECT ON “EMPLOYEE” STATUS 
A. Statutory Definitions of “Employer” 
Labor and employment statutes offer little guidance on the question 
of who an employer is, despite the fact that employer status determines 
coverage under all of these statutes.  Statutory definitions of employers are 
elusive, at best. 
Title VII, for example, only applies to businesses that employ fifteen 
or more employees for at least twenty weeks in a relevant calendar year.68  
Other employment statutes similarly define employers based on the number 
of persons employed.69  Given these definitions, it is not surprising that 
determinations of employer status often hinge on whether certain persons—
most notably, partners, shareholders, and directors70—should be counted as 
employees able to satisfy the employee minimum for coverage or whether 
they are, in essence, “employers” and thereby excluded from coverage.  In 
making this determination, courts look to “the common-law element of 
                                               
 66. Accord JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Adm’r, 828 A.2d 609, 614 (Conn. 2003) (fact that 
the hiring party permits a worker to engage in similar activities for other businesses is 
insufficient to satisfy part C of the test; worker must be “customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business” to satisfy part C of the 
standard); see McGuire v. Dep’t of Emp’t. Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
 67. McGuire, 768 P.2d at 987; see, e.g., Fleece on Earth v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 
923 A.2d 594, 599–600 (Vt. 2007) (work-at-home knitters and sewers who made clothing sold 
by plaintiff children’s wear company were employees; company that designed all of the 
clothing and provided all patterns and yarn to the homeworkers could not satisfy part A of the 
ABC test, despite the facts that workers used their own machines and worked at their own 
pace and on days and at times of their choosing); see generally Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, 
ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and 
Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53 (2015). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). 
 69. The Americans with Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) definition of “employer” is 
identical to Title VII’s definition except it raises the employee minimum to 25. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1211(5)(A) (2018). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) increases the 
minimum employee threshold to twenty (20 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018)), while the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) raises the minimum to fifty (50) and imposes 
some additional requirements (29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2018)). 
 70. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449–
50 (2003) (whether shareholders and directors of a professional corporation should be counted 
as “employees” or “employers” under Title VII). 
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control,” specifically, whether the individual acts independently and 
participates in managing the organization or whether the individual is subject 
to the organization’s control.”71 
Unlike Title VII, the FLSA does not consider employee numbers as 
a benchmark for employer status.  Instead, the FLSA defines an “employer” 
as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee,”72 and an “employee” as “any individual employed 
by an employer.”73  Again, these definitions add little to the analysis which 
has been left to the courts. 
B. Judicial Approaches to Defining Employers 
Courts often assume, without deciding, that a particular entity is an 
“employer.”  They are typically asked to determine “employer” status in two 
contexts: (1) in deciding whether a particular entity or person qualifies as an 
“employer” or “employee” for purposes of satisfying the employee threshold 
for coverage74 (i.e., only employees may be counted for coverage purposes); 
and (2) in deciding whether two or more entities or persons are considered to 
be a joint employer, jointly and severally liable for statutory violations of 
labor and employment laws.75 
There are essentially two approaches to determine who qualifies as 
the employer in the usual case.  The first approach involves a two-step 
process: (1) determining whether the person or entity falls within the 
statutory definition of employer; and (2) determining whether an 
employment relationship exists between the parties, under a hybrid economic 
                                               
 71. See generally id. at 449, quoting EEOC Compliance Man. § 605:0009 (2000). 
Clackamas further adopted a six-factor test to determine whether partners, officers, directors 
and shareholders constitute employees of the organization, including: (1) whether the 
organization could hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s 
work; (2) whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervised the individual’s work; 
(3) whether the individual reported to someone higher in the organization; (4) whether and, if 
so, to what extent the individual was able to influence the organization; (5) whether the parties 
intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; 
and (6) whether the individual shared in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization. 
Id. at 449–50, (quoting EEOC Compliance Man. § 605:0009). 
 72. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
 73. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018). 
 74. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50 (whether shareholders and directors of a 
professional corporation should be counted as “employees” or “employers” under Title VII). 
 75. See, e.g., Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir, 1997); Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, LLC, 
No. 8:06CV676, 2007 WL 5971772, at *1, *6 (Neb. Dec. 12, 2007). 
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realities test.76  Under the second approach, courts apply traditional common 
law or economic reality tests to determine employer status.77 
C. Joint Employment Theory or Doctrine 
In the joint employment scenario, each employer has control over the 
employees, in contrast to the single employer situation in which two separate 
entities are considered as one.78  The single employer doctrine is most often 
invoked by unions in a traditional labor law context to assert coverage over 
collectively bargained-for work79 and to prevent an employer from creating 
or abusing a double-breasted operation to shift work from a unionized jobsite 
to a non-unionized environment to avoid paying wages and benefits under 
the applicable bargaining agreement.80  When applied in a non-labor setting, 
the single employer doctrine may be invoked to determine whether a parent 
and subsidiary company constitute a single employer.81  Both the NLRB and 
the courts apply a multi-factor totality of the circumstances test to decide 
questions of single employer status, with particular emphasis on whether the 
two entities share centralized control over labor relations.82 
The single employer doctrine is sometimes confused with joint 
employment theory.  While the single employer doctrine has little relevance 
to the protection of contingent workers or to the characterization of 
contingent or gig work, the opposite is true of joint employment.  Joint 
employment theory generally provides that two entities or persons may be 
held jointly and severally liable for statutory or common law employment 
violations where the two entities or persons “share or co-determine those 
matters involving the essential terms and conditions of employment.”83  
                                               
 76. See Johnson v. Manpower Prof’l Servs., Inc., No. 11-20199, 2011 WL 4584757, at 
*4 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011) (applying same hybrid test in the Title VII and §1981 case); Deal v. 
State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee status in Title 
VII and ADEA case). 
 77. See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F. 2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (FLSA applying 
economic realities test). 
 78. See Butler v. Drive Auto Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 407–09 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2015); 
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 79. See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. U.S. W. Direct, 847 F.2d 1475, 1477–78 
(10th Cir. 1988). 
 80. See S. Cal. Painters & Allied Trades v. Rodin & Co., 558 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 81. Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 82. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile, 
Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965); Point Am. Servs., Inc., 353 NLRB 973 (Feb. 25, 2009), at 1, 
2009 NLRB LEXIS 49; Dow Chem. Co., 326 NLRB 288 (1988), at 288. Courts consider the 
totality of circumstances and evaluate four factors in deciding single employer status: (1) 
whether operations are interrelated, (2) whether common management exists; (3) whether the 
parties have common ownership of financial control; and (4) where the two entities have share 
centralized control over labor relations. The fourth factor often emerges as the most important 
one. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians, 380 U.S. at 256. 
 83. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Stated differently, “courts look to whether both entities exercise sufficient 
control over the same employees” so that each may be considered an 
employer.84 
In practice, the joint employment doctrine may prevent an entity that 
effectively employs workers from shifting its employment obligations and 
any related liabilities to a second entity.85  Thus, it has the potential to extend 
employment protections to gig and other contingent workers depending on 
the joint employment theory applied.  As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, 
“the joint employment doctrine . . . recognizes the reality of changes in 
modern employment, in which increasing numbers of [contingent] workers 
are employed by temporary staffing companies that exercise little control 
over their day-to-day activities.”86 
There are, in fact, several versions of the joint employment doctrine. 
Both the NLRB and the United States Department of Labor have expanded 
and contracted their definitions of “joint employment” over the last five 
years.87  The NLRB’s shift in position has generally revolved whether a 
putative employer must exert direct and significant control over the essential 
terms and conditions of employment in order to be held jointly liable or 
whether “indirect control” or the “reserved authority” to exercise control is 
sufficient for a finding of joint employment.88  The Department of Labor’s 
shift in position occurred with the adoption and later withdrawal of 
Administrator’s Interpretation 2016-1, originally issued in January 2016, 
which established new and expansive standards for determining joint 
employment under the FLSA and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection Act.89 
The courts also have applied different standards in deciding whether, 
and to what extent, joint employment exists in a particular case.  Historically, 
courts have used the economic realities test, the common law control test, or 
the hybrid test to determine in a fact-specific way whether joint employment 
                                               
 84. See Bristol v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (quoting Virgo v. Rivera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 85. Butler v. Drive Auto Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2015); Sibley Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 86. Butler, 793 F.3d at 410. 
 87. Celine McNicholas & Marni von Wilpert, The joint employer standard and the 
National Labor Relations Board, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 31, 2017), https://www.epi.org/p
ublication/the-joint-employer-standard-and-the-national-labor-relations-board-what-is-at-
stake-for-workers/. 
 88. Compare Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 NLRB No.186 (Aug. 27, 2015) 
with Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd. v. Brandt, 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 
NLRB LEXIS 635, vacated on other grounds, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 103 (Feb. 26, 2018). The 
Hy-Brand standard is now the subject of proposed rule-making notwithstanding a D.C. Circuit 
opinion endorsing the NLRB’s decision in Browning-Ferris. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also supra note 8 and accomp
anying text. 
 89. See USDOL, Wage & Hour Div, Adm’rs Inter. No. 26-1, “Joint Employment Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act”, 2016 
WL 284582 (Jan. 20, 2016). 
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exists.90  While these tests are essentially the same tests used to determine 
employee status, the factors are modified when the inquiry relates to joint 
employment.  To add even more confusion, the factors change with the 
various circuits. 
In Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the joint employment theory to determine that “chore workers” hired 
to provide domestic services by public aid recipients were employees of the 
state welfare agencies that offered the welfare program.91  The court reasoned 
that the agencies were employers as a matter of economic reality based on 
the “considerable control” they exercised over the plaintiffs’ daily work.92  
The court also identified four factors as relevant to the determination of joint 
employment: “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and 
fire employees; (2) supervised and controlled work schedules or conditions 
of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of [the worker’s] 
payment; and (4) maintained employment records.”93 
While several courts have adopted the Bonnette factors in joint 
employment cases, other courts have sharply criticized them or rejected a 
factor-based approach altogether.94  Some of the criticisms have been 
directed to Bonnette’s focus on the degree to which the putative employer 
exercised direct control over the employee’s daily work and activities.95 
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit adopted a new joint employment 
test in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.96  In Salinas, the court rejected 
the Bonnette approach, which focused on the relationship between the 
employee and the putative joint employer, in favor of a new test focused “on 
the relationship between the putative joint employers.”97  Under the latter 
                                               
 90. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214–16 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying 
the common law test with the Reid factors); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 
222, 227 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying a hybrid common law/economic realities test); Love v. JP 
Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 702–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying a five-factor economic 
realities test). 
 91. 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 92. Id. at 1470. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Baystate Alt. Staffing v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Carter 
v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Zheng v. Liberty Apparel 
Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (criticizing Bonnette as focused too narrowly on the 
employer’s right to control and adding six factors to the Bonnette four- factor test). The 
additional Zheng factors include: whether the putative joint employer’s premises and 
equipment were used for the work; and whether responsibility under the contract with the 
putative joint employer passed “without material changes” from one group of potential joint 
employees to another. Id. at 72. 
 95. See, e.g., Moldenhauer v. Tazewell Pekin Consol. Commc’ns Ctr., 536 F.3d 640, 
644 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a factor-based approach to joint employment); see also Zheng, 
355 F.3d at 69. 
 96. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 97. Id. at 141. 
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test, joint employment exists if the two entities “are not completely 
disassociated with respect to the worker.”98 
The Salinas court also identified the following “non-exhaustive” 
factors as relevant to a joint employment inquiry: 
(1) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative 
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the 
ability to direct, control, or supervise the worker, whether by 
direct or indirect means; 
(2) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative 
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the 
power to—directly or indirectly—hire or fire the worker or 
modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s employment; 
(3) The degree of permanency and duration of the 
relationship between the putative joint employers; 
(4) Whether through shared management or a direct or 
indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer 
controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with 
the other putative joint employer; 
(5) Whether the work is performed on a premises owned or 
controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers, 
independently or in connection with one another; and 
(6) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative 
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate 
responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an 
employer, such as handling payroll; providing workers’ 
compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or providing 
the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to 
complete the work.99 
As demonstrated in Part III of this Article, the Fourth Circuit’s joint 
employment test in Salinas provides a vehicle with which to extend 
employment protections to gig and other contingent workers, including those 
in the ridesharing business.100  Another such vehicle is the ABC test adopted 
                                               
 98. Id. citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2. 
 99. Id. at 141–42; see also Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 769–70 (4th Cir. 
2017). 
 100. Salinas, 848 F.3d 125. 
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by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. 
Superior Court.101 
III. ALTERNATIVE/CONTINGENT WORK ARRANGEMENTS: 
APPLYING TRADITIONAL TESTS AND EXPLORING NEW ONES 
A. Alternative Approaches to Gig Classification 
The traditional tests to determine whether a worker is an “employee” 
or “independent contractor” are less than helpful in characterizing workers 
who perform “crowdsourced work” or other virtual work.102  Websites such 
as Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk,103 have created new forms of work never 
contemplated by the FLSA or at common law.  In the crowdsourcing model, 
firms post digital tasks to online platforms where workers can accept and 
complete particular tasks. Amazon and other crowdsourcing vendors “serve[] 
as conduit[s] for the worker to submit the completed work, and for the firm 
to pay the worker.”104  Crowdsourcing vendors typically require workers and 
firms to sign their “click-wrap agreements” with pre-populated terms. 
Workers and firms only negotiate rates of pay and the specifics of the tasks 
to be performed; the vendor controls all the rest.105 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform places a number of other 
restrictions on the crowdsourcing relationship, including payment of 
Amazon’s service fee and a prohibition against firms and workers contracting 
independently and outside the scope of Amazon’s agreement.106  Amazon 
also demands that workers perform services as independent contractors.107  
Despite the fact that Amazon dictates the fundamental terms of the 
crowdsourcing relationships, to date, it has successfully avoided employer 
obligations and liability based on the terms of its unilateral worker contracts.  
Two factors have helped to accomplish this result: (1) characterizing the 
                                               
 101. 416 P.3d 1, 48–50 (Cal. 2018). 
 102. In “crowdsourcing,” computers automate and breakdown tasks and source out the 
work to be performed. The workers who perform the tasks are commonly referred to as 
“clickworkers.” See Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the 
Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1088–1089 (2009). 
 103. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is one of the most prominent crowdsourcing websites. 
The “turkers” may perform a variety of tasks, including tagging photos and comparing 
products, and receive payment in the form of credits from the Amazon.com website. Id. at 
1089. 
 104. See Caleb Holloway, Keeping Freedom in Freelance: It’s Time for Gig Firms and 
Gig Workers to Update Their Relationship Status, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. 
L. 298, 312 (Spring 2016) (quoting A. Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor 
Law in the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 143, 148 (2011)). 
 105. Id. at 313. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Felstiner, supra note 104, at 163 (noting that Amazon’s unilateral contract with 
workers also informs them that they “will not be entitled to any employee benefits[] and will 
not be eligible to recover worker’s compensation if injured.”). 
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work as piecework rather than hourly work, and (2) the fact that Amazon 
itself is “not involved in the actual transaction between workers and firms.”108 
Similar challenges to the definition of work have emerged with 
ridesharing companies like Lyft and Uber, which provide platforms for the 
performance of non-virtual work.  In such “gig work,” the consumer actually 
hires the worker to provide rides through the mobile app platform 
provided.109  Drivers are hired as independent contractors and approved 
online and, once approved, can access the app and start accepting trips.110  
Although Uber drivers are able to choose their own days and hours of work 
and use their own vehicles, Uber has contracted with third parties to help 
drivers lease vehicles and obtain insurance and coverage.111  Uber also sets 
rates, collects payment from the consumer via its app, and controls certain 
aspects of driver performance—such as the ability to terminate drivers with 
low acceptance rates.112 
While Uber has attempted to defend certain worker misclassification 
cases by claiming that it is a “technology company” and not a “transportation 
company,” there is no question that its drivers are integral to the company’s 
business.113  The fact that Uber relies on its workers to perform the essence 
of the business, in contrast to “turkers,” who are not at the core of Amazon’s 
business, is another reason why Amazon has managed to avoid worker 
misclassification suits by freelancers performing tasks through its 
Mechanical Turk.  Under the traditional tests used to determine “employee” 
versus “independent contractor” status, courts view the worker’s economic 
dependence and whether the tasks performed are integral to the company’s 
business as critical factors in the analysis favoring employment.114  Uber 
workers tend to meet these criteria more often than freelancers who work 
through Mechanical Turk; otherwise, the control asserted over the “turkers” 
by Amazon and that exerted over drivers by Uber is essentially the same. 
In reality, all of these workers straddle the line between “independent 
contractor” and “employee” with no easy demarcation between the two. 
While all commentators and the courts acknowledge difficulties in applying 
the traditional employee-independent contractor dichotomy to gig workers, 
they have very different approaches to reconciling the two. 
                                               
 108. Holloway, supra note 104, at 314–15. Notably, Amazon also retains the right to 
terminate a worker’s contract at any time and thereby prevent the worker from continuing to 
perform work through its platform. 
 109. See generally Andrew G. Malik, Note, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1729, 1746–47 (2017). 
 110. Id. at 1747–48. 
 111. Id. at 1748. 
 112. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see 
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 113. O’Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1137. 
 114. See, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); Saleem v. Corp. Transp. 
Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 141–46 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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Some commentators suggest that a new classification of worker 
should emerge to cover individuals who perform gig work.  This new 
classification of worker has been variously described in the literature as a 
“dependent contractor”115 or an “independent employee.”116  It is designed to 
offer greater protections to gig workers “who are not as autonomous as 
independent contractors but who also are not subject to the same degree of 
instruction and supervision as traditional employees.”117  As a variation on 
this theme, there are those who propose a new test to determine whether gig 
workers qualify as employees,118 and others who extend certain protections 
to gig workers—such as the right to bargain—regardless of their 
classification as independent contractors or employees.119 
Still, other commentators advocate that gig workers should be 
classified as “employees” without proposing a new test for classification 
based on the degree of control exerted by the company providing the app or 
platform120 or, from a policy standpoint, because the workers are low wage 
earners or marginalized.121 
There are also commentators who argue that there is no need to make 
any changes at this juncture, instead adopting a “wait and see” attitude to 
allow free market forces time to flush out the issues.122  These commentators 
appear to be more concerned with stifling economic growth in the gig 
economy than with extending worker protections at significant costs to gig 
companies.123 
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A final approach argues against blanket classifications for gig 
workers, since there is a wide variation in how they work and, instead, posits 
that gig workers should be classified on a case-by-case basis.124 
B. Using Nontraditional Models to Protect Gig Workers While 
Safeguarding Flexibility in Their Work 
As noted above, there are two existing theories that could extend 
protections to gig workers without sacrificing the flexibility central to their 
work: the Fourth Circuit’s joint employment test articulated in Salinas v. 
Commercial Interiors, Inc.125 and the ABC test adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in Dynamex.126 
Unlike the traditional common law right-to-control test or the 
economic realities test, the joint employment test pronounced in Salinas is 
helpful in analyzing the nature of triangular relationships like those created 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  The firm hiring the worker and 
Amazon are interrelated in establishing work parameters and in defining the 
terms of the relationship. In fact, Amazon’s control over the worker is greater 
than that of the firm, whose role is limited to negotiating rates of pay and 
assigning the tasks to be performed.  But it is the relationship of the putative 
employers that determines employee status in Salinas,127 and on the 
Mechanical Turk platform, Amazon and its participating firms together 
“codetermine . . . the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s 
employment.”128  On this basis, the “turkers” emerge as employees entitled 
to protection under federal and state labor and employment laws. 
Application of the ABC test referenced in Dynamex129 produces a 
similar result for workers in the ridesharing business.  The ABC test 
presumes an employment relationship unless the hiring party demonstrates 
all of the following:  
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of 
the hirer in connection with performance of the work, both 
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under the contract for the performance of such work and in 
fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the 
usual course of the hiring party’s business; and (C) that the 
worker is customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature 
as the work performed for the hiring entity.130 
Under the ABC test, Uber drivers would be classified as employees, 
because the company cannot satisfy at least two parts of the test needed for 
independent contractor status.  Not only does Uber exert control over its 
drivers based on certain rules, fare collection, and pricing, but also, without 
question, the drivers’ work is an integral part of Uber’s business.  Indeed, 
without its drivers, Uber has no business. 
CONCLUSION 
The trend toward gig and other contingent work is a natural 
consequence of technological advances that are expected to grow 
exponentially in the twenty-first century.  While the flexibility associated 
with gig work is attractive to those seeking more work-life balance, 
supplemental income, or both, there are social and economic risks and costs 
related to that work.  There are likewise significant costs to companies 
engaged in contingent work who misclassify their workers either 
intentionally or because the prevailing definitions of employee and 
independent contractor simply do not fit the “gig lifestyle.”  Therefore, new 
paradigms are needed to reconcile the unique demands associated with gig 
and other contingent work. 
Because the legislative process reacts slowly to new challenges and 
because contingent workers are less than a priority, it is unlikely that 
Congress will move to protect these workers in the immediate future.  In the 
meantime, contingent workers are growing in number and becoming 
increasingly marginalized.  Those who are classified as independent 
contractors lack the bargaining and earning power traditionally associated 
with bona fide independent contractors.  Ever-dependent on the “gig,” their 
work life hangs in a delicate balance.  However, there are immediate 
solutions without legislative action.  Expanding the scope and application of 
the ABC test and modern joint employment doctrine are two alternative 
solutions to this growing problem. 
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